By Brian Balmer (auth.)
Read or Download Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930–65 PDF
Similar weapons & warfare books
E-book through Lecker, Seymour
Creation and historical past --, matters concerning websites containing quite a lot of buried chemical guns materiel --, overview elements for foreign destruction applied sciences --, Tier 1 foreign munitions processing applied sciences --, Tier I overseas agent-only processing applied sciences --, Tier 2 overseas applied sciences for munitions and agent-only processing --, Assessing huge burial websites and getting access to chemical battle materiel
The 1991 Persian Gulf conflict used to be thought of a quick and profitable army operation with few accidents and deaths. a great number of returning veterans, despite the fact that, quickly begun reporting illnesses that they believed to be linked to their provider within the gulf. below a Congressional mandate, the Institute of medication (IOM) is reviewing a big selection of biologic, chemical, and actual brokers to figure out if publicity to those brokers will be liable for the veterans' illnesses.
This new initiative demonstrates a approach and instruments for dealing with the safety vulnerability of web sites that produce and deal with chemical substances, petroleum items, prescription drugs, and comparable fabrics resembling fertilizers and water remedy chemical compounds. contains: firm screening; web site screening; defense research; defense vulnerability review; motion making plans and monitoring.
Extra resources for Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930–65
By the following April, Fildes reported to Hankey that it would be ‘futile’ to simply spray anthrax over German pastures in a random fashion. 48 This was thought to be the most promising line of enquiry and was soon allowed to set the agenda at the fledgling research station. A year into their research, when Fildes was asked by the chairman of the Porton Experiments Committee for 40 Britain and Biological Warfare a list of possible methods for waging biological warfare, he apologized and replied: ‘I am afraid it will consist of only one item.
Contaminated bullets would present a danger to factory workers and, should the organisms actually survive over time, to the soldiers handling them. They dismissed contaminated shrapnel shells for the same reasons. High-explosive shells were thought to be equally dubious by the advisors because the high temperatures involved would destroy bacteria. The subcommittee then turned to consider possible means of distributing toxic material from aeroplanes. Research was already under way at Porton on the physics of sprayed liquids and glass containers dropped from aeroplanes and so the subcommittee recommended that no further research in this area was necessary.
Nevertheless, he trusted the latest intelligence reports which indicated that sabotage was a far greater hazard than any putative resort to aeroplanes. When Banting’s memorandum was finally discussed by the BW Committee, the general consensus was to side with Topley. Hankey confirmed that Banting’s recommendations would entail a change of policy because no offensively oriented research had yet been initiated. 19 And while other members of the committee added their agreement, Laidlaw, who was conducting the only biological warfare related research so far sanctioned, added that ‘further progress could not be made by purely theoretical discussion, but only by experiments’.